This section contains further exposition (including proofs) for Section 4. A.1 Limitations of utility difference as an instability measure But its utility difference remains at 0. Minimum stabilizing subsidy equals Subset Instability for any market outcome. This is no larger than Subset Instability by definition. Let's take the maximum weight matching of We first formally define the unhappiness of a coalition, as follows. Recall that, in terms of unhappiness, Proposition 4.3 is as follows: Proposition 4.3. By Proposition 4.2, we know that Subset Instability is equal to Thus, it suffices to prove that the maximum unhappiness of any coalition is equal to (7).

Algorithmically, we show that "optimism in the face of uncertainty," the principle underlying many bandit algorithms, applies to a primal-dual formulation of matching with transfers and

Dynamic resource allocation in multi-agent settings often requires balancing efficiency with fairness over time--a challenge inadequately addressed by conventional, myopic fairness measures. Motivated by behavioral insights that human judgments of fairness evolve with temporal distance, we introduce a novel framework for temporal fairness that incorporates past-discounting mechanisms. By applying a tunable discount factor to historical utilities, our approach interpolates between instantaneous and perfect-recall fairness, thereby capturing both immediate outcomes and long-term equity considerations. Beyond aligning more closely with human perceptions of fairness, this past-discounting method ensures that the augmented state space remains bounded, significantly improving computational tractability in sequential decision-making settings. We detail the formulation of discounted-recall fairness in both additive and averaged utility contexts, illustrate its benefits through practical examples, and discuss its implications for designing balanced, scalable resource allocation strategies.

Fairness in decision-making processes is often quantified using probabilistic metrics. However, these metrics may not fully capture the real-world consequences of unfairness. In this article, we adopt a utility-based approach to more accurately measure the real-world impacts of decision-making process. In particular, we show that if the concept of $\varepsilon$-fairness is employed, it can possibly lead to outcomes that are maximally unfair in the real-world context. Additionally, we address the common issue of unavailable data on false negatives by proposing a reduced setting that still captures essential fairness considerations. We illustrate our findings with two real-world examples: college admissions and credit risk assessment. Our analysis reveals that while traditional probability-based evaluations might suggest fairness, a utility-based approach uncovers the necessary actions to truly achieve equality. For instance, in the college admission case, we find that enhancing completion rates is crucial for ensuring fairness. Summarizing, this paper highlights the importance of considering the real-world context when evaluating fairness.

Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. However, since preferences are inherently uncertain during learning, the classical notion of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik, 1971) is unattainable in these settings. To bridge this gap, we develop a framework and algorithms for learning stable market outcomes under uncertainty. Our primary setting is matching with transferable utilities, where the platform both matches agents and sets monetary transfers between them. We design an incentive-aware learning objective that captures the distance of a market outcome from equilibrium. Using this objective, we analyze the complexity of learning as a function of preference structure, casting learning as a stochastic multi-armed bandit problem. Algorithmically, we show that "optimism in the face of uncertainty," the principle underlying many bandit algorithms, applies to a primal-dual formulation of matching with transfers and leads to near-optimal regret bounds. Our work takes a first step toward elucidating when and how stable matchings arise in large, data-driven marketplaces.

Bayesian adaptive inference is widely used in psychophysics to estimate psychometric parameters. Most applications used myopic one-step ahead strategy which only optimizes the immediate utility. The widely held expectation is that global optimization strategies that explicitly optimize over some horizon can largely improve the performance of the myopic strategy. With limited studies that compared myopic and global strategies, the expectation was not challenged and researchers are still investing heavily to achieve global optimization. Is that really worthwhile? This paper provides a discouraging answer based on experimental simulations comparing the performance improvement and computation burden between global and myopic strategies in parameter estimation of multiple models. The finding is that the added horizon in global strategies has negligible contributions to the improvement of optimal global utility other than the most immediate next steps (of myopic strategy). Mathematical recursion is derived to prove that the contribution of utility improvement of each added horizon step diminishes fast as that step moves further into the future.